Energia Nucleare e Salute
Fukushima, Tepco: “Anche Nei reattori 2 e 3 Nocciolo Parzialmente Fuso”
Video sulle conseguenze delle radiazioni sull’ infanzia
La Tepco ha ammesso che le barre di combustibile nucleare usato si sono fuse parzialmente anche in altri due reattori della centrale di Fukushima-Daiichi, portando quindi a tre il numero degli impianti critici. La maggior parte del combustibile del reattore due si è fuso ed è sceso alla base della vasca di contenimento 101 ore dopo il sistema. Una situazione simile si è verificata al reattore tre, 60 ore dopo le scosse. Molto prima, la fusione si è verificata al reattore numero uno.
Interessante Video in cui Ernesto Burgio, coordinatore del Comitato Scientifico Isde (International Society of Doctors for Environment), ci parla delle conseguenze sui bambini dell’ esposizione alle radiazioni
Unit 1 tenmliie (abbreviated) 11MAR 1537 loss of all AC after 2nd tsunami 1818 placed isolation condenser in service 1825 removed isolation condenser from service (likely due to concerns over brittle fracture prevention due to the high CDR observed earlier) 2119 water level 8 above TAF (likely accurate indication and with water over the fuel no/minimal core damage. Also no data to establish a water loss rate which is going to be the rate of water leaving through the relief valves) 2151 reactor building access loss due to high dose rates (indication of first fuel damage core is likely partially uncovered causing the fuel damage) 2200 water level jumps to 21.7 above TAF (this is indication of reactor vessel depressurization and we are seeing flashing in the reference legs) 12MAR 0230 Containment reaches 122 psia 0245 Reactor pressure decreased to 116 psia (the report does not say this but having lived through reference leg flashing during transients and rapid plant cool downs any water level is going to be erroneous until the reference legs are force fed) 0419 The containment vessel pressure drops to 113 psia (this would indicate the containment began to leak at this point as pressure was being relieved and is probably contributed to the read levels later in the torus and in general to the workers. This established the path for hydrogen to possibly enter the reactor building later.) 0514 onsite dose rates are noticed (this is when the operators think the containment failed) 0900 order given to vent unit 1 1430 Unit 1 effectively vented (page 11and 20) due to rupture disc failure. Not due to operator action 1536 explosionI am at a loss to explain how without power and more specifically control air how the operators would be able to protect the plant and prevent containment failure. As Kit will be sure to point out I never operated a BWR (I’m SMR PWR all the way) so I may have missed something in my analysis. I also couldn’t find the containment design pressure through this reading. I imagine that design pressure is around 60 psia. It also looks like the rupture discs are more of a hinderance than help Reply
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